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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(4) (2001), which grants the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases 
transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from a Modified Judgment 
and Minute Entry of the Third Judicial District Court. The Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001). The 
Supreme Court transferred the case to this court on October 19, 2001. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this brief: 
1. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant Doms' Motion to Amend 
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59 U.R.C.P. alleging that the Court failed and refused to grant 
Appellant Doms all amounts paid under the Trust Deed Note when the Court ordered 
rescission of the contract in this matter? 
2. Did the Trial Court err by failing to implement the Final Decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in this matter dated June 24, 1999? 
3. The standard on appeal for each of these cases is the legal error standard, 
pursuant to Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
("Pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of the case 
and must be followed in subsequent proceedings; . . . (thus) the lower court must 
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate 
court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces"). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 
Any determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are set forth in the 
addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a Final Judgment (Add. 1 and 2) of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Summit County, State of Utah. The statement of the case is more specifically 
spelled out in the following Statement of Facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A concise statement of facts material to consideration of the questions presented is 
as follows: 
a. In March 1982, Appellees Dan and Jeanie Scott, Ellen Anderson and 
D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson's now deceased husband, sold a parcel of property 
known as Rossi Hills (the Property) in Park City, Utah to Doms and Michael R. McCoy 
for residential development. (R. at 6744, F. of F. 17.) 
b. In connection with this sale, Appellees executed a Warranty Deed 
that included a covenant against encumbrances. (R. at 6743-44, F. of F. 1, 4.) Doms and 
McCoy executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to secure payment of the balance 
owed on the purchase price of $194,250.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19, 20.) 
c. McCoy no longer has any interest in the property and is not involved 
in this appeal. (R. at 7185-86) 
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d. The purchase price for the Rossi Hills property was the amount of 
$276,750.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 17.) 
e. The Appellees received the sum of $10,000.00 as earnest money in 
the aforementioned transaction, and a down payment of $72,500.00, leaving a balance 
due on the purchase price of $194,250.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 18.) 
f. The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $194,250.00 
executed by Doms and McCoy called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25 up to 
and including January 10, 1985. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19, 20.) 
g. All of these monthly payments were received by Appellees, in the 
total amount of $72,520.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 22.) 
h. The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest, 
was due on January 25, 1985. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19.) 
i. In late 1984 or early 1985, Doms' attorney informed him that several 
encroachments and easements existed on the property. (R. at 7504-05.) As a result, 
Doms did not make the scheduled balloon payment on the property on January 25, 1985, 
and attempted to deed the property back to Appellees in return for cancellation of the 
Trust Deed Note. (R. at 7512-14.) 
j . Appellees did not respond to this offer and, in June 1985, filed a 
complaint seeking to foreclose on the property. (R. at 1.) Two years later, Appellees 
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy because they failed to file an 
answer in response to the Appellees' Complaint. (R. at 34-40.) 
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k. Nine days after entry of the default judgment, Doms filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim to Appellees' Complaint. (R. at 41-44.) Approximately four months 
later, the trial court entered an Order setting aside the default judgment against Doms on 
the condition that Doms pay all attorney's fees incurred by Appellees in obtaining the 
default judgment. (R. at 76-78.) However, the court reserved a final ruling on the award 
of these fees until final disposition of the case on the merits. (R. at 245-47.) 
1. In May 1987, the property wras sold to Summit County in a 
foreclosure sale for the non-payment of property taxes. (R. at 3115.) At that time, title to 
the property was held by Domcoy, a corporation formed by Doms and McCoy, to which 
they had transferred their interest in the property. (R. at 7182-84.) 
m. After Doms paid all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, 
Summit County conveyed the property to Domcoy by quit claim deed. (R. at 3116-17; 
3160-61.) Domcoy then conveyed the property to Doms. (R. at 3117.) 
n. On remand, the trial court found that the conveyance of the property 
from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms holding "clear title to 
the property." (R. at 6692.) 
o. In the meantime, Appellees had filed a separate action (Civil No. 
10066 consolidated with the instant action, Civil No. 8339) challenging the tax sale and 
subsequent purchase of the property by Summit County, seeking to quiet title to the 
property in their favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County, Plaintiffs and Doms, the 
trial court set aside the tax sale, and the tax sale was found to have no effect whatsoever 
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on the ultimate outcome of this case. Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, [^12, 984 
P.2d392(Add. 3). 
p. In July 1988, Doms had amended his Counterclaim, seeking 
rescission of the contract or, in the alternative, damages for breach of implied covenants, 
breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. (R. at 237-42.) 
q. The trial was bifurcated and a three day trial was held on April 17-
19, 1990 on the issue of rescission of the contract. (R. at 4188-95.) Appellees argued, on 
the basis of laches, that Doms was prohibited from rescinding the contract because there 
was an unreasonable delay between the time Doms learned of the basis for rescission and 
his attempt to rescind the contract. (R. at 4191.) The trial court subsequently issued a 
Memorandum Decision, finding that because Doms unreasonably delayed seeking 
rescission, laches barred rescission of the contract. (R. at 4194.) 
r. The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990 and 
focused on the issue of whether Doms was entitled to damages as a result of the 
encumbrances on the property. (R. at 7753-8285.) The trial court later held a hearing on 
the issue of attorney's fees. (R. at 6360-6540.) In its Second Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Judgment, the trial court, based upon 
laches, denied Doms' request for rescission and awarded Doms $83,000.00 in damages as 
a result of the encumbrances on the property and $101.50 in costs. (R. at 6874-6906.) 
The trial court also awarded $41,333.20 in attorney's fees and costs, plus interest to 
Appellees. (R. at 6898.) 
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s. Both parties appealed the trial court's decision on several grounds. 
The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently issued an unpublished Memorandum Decision 
holding that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of laches to bar rescission of 
the contract without first entering Findings of Fact regarding whether Appellees were 
prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission. Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653-CA, 
slip op. at 2-3 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished memorandum decision). 
t. Consequently, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
trial court for further findings on the issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court cannot 
find from the evidence presented that the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay, the 
equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Id. 
u. On remand, the trial court again refused to rescind the contract, 
concluding Appellees were prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission. A new 
appeal followed: Anderson, et al v. Doms, et al, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 
3). 
v. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court 
and drew the following conclusions: 
i. "Although Doms failed to make payments required by the 
Trust Deed Note, he was excused from doing so as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances." Id. at f^ 17. 
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ii. "Any prejudice that resulted from Doms' failure to make 
payments pursuant to the Trust Deed Note was precipitated by Plaintiffs' breach of 
warranty." Id. 
iii. "The only theory Plaintiffs advance on appeal to bar 
rescission of the contract is laches. This theory fails, however, because Plaintiffs have 
not shown any prejudice. Therefore, Doms is entitled to rescind the contract as a remedy 
for breach of warranty." Id. at If 19. 
iv. "On remand, the trial court should determine what is 
necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the 
contract. See Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984)(affirming rescission 
of contract and placing parties in original positions by allowing recovery of payments 
already made under contract). In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the 
rule is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of the parties. How this 
is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it can, is a matter which is within the discretion 
of the trial court under the facts as found to exist by the trier of fact. The trial court 
therefore has discretion to fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy so that an 
aggrieved party is adequately compensated for its loss, so long as that remedy is not 
duplicative (citing cases)." Id. 
v. "In this case, Doms apparently made no improvements or 
changes to the property such that the parties could not be returned to their respective 
positions prior to entering into the contract. We therefore remand this issue to the trial 
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court for a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental 
value plus interest. Id. at 1125. 
vi. "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the 
original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and Domcoy." 
Doms, 1999 UT App 207, f21, n.12, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 3). 
vii. "Both parties appeal from the trial court's award of attorneys 
fees and costs. . . . Although Doms requests fees for pursuing his rescission remedy . . . 
he is not entitled to fees and costs incurred in conjunction with breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances. . . . We therefore do not award any attorneys fees to Doms." Id 
at 1J22. 
viii. "Regarding the trial court's award of fees and costs to 
Plaintiffs, we affirm the trial court's award of fees and costs incurred in obtaining the 
default judgment (citing cases). . . . However, because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing 
party, we vacate all other awards to Plaintiffs." Id. at [^23. 
ix. "Thus, we remand to the trial court for consideration of 
Plaintiffs' counsel's evidence regarding reasonable fees incurred in connection with 
obtaining the default judgment and an appropriate award based on that evidence." Id 
x. " . . . rescission of the contract in this case is consistent with 
Utah case law. Accordingly, the trial court should order rescission and determine an 
appropriate remedy in connection with rescinding the contract. . . . We also affirm the 
trial court's fee award to Plaintiffs incurred in connection with obtaining the default 
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judgment but vacate all other attorney fee awards to Plaintiffs . . . Reversed and 
remanded." Id at 1f24. 
w. Appellees petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing, but in 
an Order dated August 18, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Rehearing. 
x. On January 27, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court denied the Petition 
for Certiorari filed by Appellees in this matter. (R. at 8582-83.) 
y. On January 31, 2000, the Remittitur was issued from the Utah Court 
of Appeals to the trial court to implement the Opinion issued by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on June 24, 1999. (R. at 8584-95.) 
z. The District Court, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, heard 
the argument of counsel regarding Appellant Doms' "Motion to Enter Judgment on the 
June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals" on June 29, 2000. (R. at 8833-
34.) An oral ruling was issued by the Court at that time. (R. at 8833-34.) 
aa. Appellant Doms filed his Motion to Amend Judgment pursuant to 
Rule 59 U.R.C.P. on or about July 27, 2000. (R. at 8848-51.) 
bb. Appellees filed a "Motion to Expand or Broaden the Proposed 
Modified Judgment in Order to Properly Comply with the Order of the Court of Appeals" 
on or about September 28, 2000. (R. at 8898-8906.) 
cc. The Court entered its Modified Judgment (Add. 1) and Minute Entry 
(Add. 2) on or about July 7, 2001 denying both Appellant's and Appellees' Motions. (R. 
at 8948-52.) 
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dd. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about August 1, 2001. 
(R. at 8956-58.) 
ee. A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by Appellees on August 10, 
2001. (R. at 8972-74.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is Appellant's position that this case can be quickly and easily disposed of by 
this Court. The Utah Court of Appeals (hereafter "this Court") clearly held in Anderson 
v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, [^19, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 3), that rescission is an appropriate 
remedy in this case, and because of that fact, the trial court should have restored the 
parties to their original positions prior to the contract entered into in March of 1982. In 
order to restore the parties to their positions prior to the contract, Defendant Doms should 
be required to provide a Quit-Claim Deed restoring title to the property to Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs should have been required to refund all monies paid on the contract, including 
interest payments paid, plus interest. Doms should also be entitled to all taxes paid on 
the property during the period of time he was in possession of it. 
In its Modified Judgment dated July 7, 2001, the trial court did indeed award 
Doms $10,000.00 earnest money at 10% simple interest from the date of payment which 
had been paid on the contract, the sum of $72,500.00 at 10% simple interest which 
constituted the down payment on the contract, and all payments made for taxes on the 
property at 10% interest. However, the trial court chose not to award Doms monthly 
interest payments made on the contract payments which totaled $72,520.00. Although 
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the trial court opined that had the money been borrowed from any other party Defendant 
Doms would have had to repay it, Defendant Doms argues that the interest payments 
made on a monthly basis on the contract (which totaled $72,520.00) were part of the 
contract requirements. 
The mere fact that the contract called for a balloon payment with monthly interest 
payments being made should not alter the trial court's requirement to restore the parties to 
their original positions prior to the contract being entered into as ordered by this Court in 
its June 24, 1999 decision. This Court expressly ordered the repayment of interest 
payments when it stated that it was instructing the trial court to "determine what is 
necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the 
contract... we therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and 
award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest paid." See 
Doms, 1999 UT App 207, pO, 984 P.2d 392 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to comply with the specific instructions 
of this Court that Doms was to be awarded "net payments paid by him less rental value 
plus interest paid." Id. This Court should therefore reverse and vacate the Modified 
Judgment and remand it to the trial court with an Order requiring it to enter Judgment to 
Defendant Doms for all amounts paid on the contract, including the $72,520.00 paid in 
monthly payments which constituted interest on the Trust Deed Note prior to the 
triggering of the balloon payment coming due plus 10% simple prejudgment interest and 
postjudgment interest on all amounts after a final judgment is entered. This Court should 
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affirm all other components of the Modified Judgment to be part of a new final judgment 
to be entered by the trial court upon remand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPLEMENT THE 
FINAL DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DATED 
JUNE 24, 1999 IN THIS CASE. 
This is the Third Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals regarding this case which 
was actually begun in 1985 by the filing of Plaintiffs' (Appellees) Complaint. While it 
was hoped by Defendant (Appellant) Doms that the June 24, 1999 decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals (i.e. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 1)) would have been 
the last necessary appeal in this case, the trial court failed to implement the decision and 
clear mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals upon remand, necessitating this Third 
Appeal. 
In the Second Appeal, the Court of Appeals clearly held that on remand, the trial 
court should determine what is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the 
time the parties entered into the contract. See id. at f20. The Court of Appeals also 
stated: 
In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the rule is 
equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of 
the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed 
whether it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of 
the trial court under the facts as found to exist by the trier of 
fact. The trial court therefore has discretion to fashion an 
adequate and reasonable remedy so that an aggrieved party is 
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adequately compensated for its loss, so long as that remedy is 
not duplicative. 
Id 
The Court of Appeals went on to say: 
In this case, Doms apparently made no improvements or 
changes to the property such that the parties could not be 
returned to their respective positions prior to entering into the 
contract. We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for 
a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid 
by him less rental value plus interest. Doms is entitled to a 
refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the 
property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and 
Domcoy. 
Id at |20, n. 12. 
It was the position of Defendant (Appellant) Doms before the trial court that he 
should have been awarded all amounts paid to Plaintiffs (Appellees) pursuant to the 
contract, with interest from the date each payment was made until date of judgment at the 
prejudgment rate, and thereafter at the post-judgment rate until paid. (R. at 8612.) 
Defendant Doms also claimed that he should have been awarded all taxes paid on the 
subject property up to and including the date of actual rescission to be ordered by the 
lower court with interest from the date each tax payment was made until paid. (R. at 
8612.) Doms argued that he should have been awarded the following amounts: 
1. $10,000.00 paid as earnest money at 10% interest from the date of 
payment; 
2. $72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% interest; 
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3. Interest payments made on the Trust Deed Note at 10% interest from the 
date each payment was made, as follows: 
a. Payment made April 21, 1982 of $2266.25; 
b. Payment made May 24, 1982 of $2266.25; 
c. Payment made June 14, 1982 of $2266.25; 
d. Payment made July 16, 1982 of $2266.25; 
e. Payment made August 25, 1982 of $2266.25; 
f Payment made October 8, 1982 of $4,532.50; 
g. Payment made December 22, 1982 of $4,532.50; 
h. Payment made December 22, 1982 of $2,266.25; 
i. Payment made March 8, 1983 of $2266.25; 
j . Payment made April 27, 1983 of $4532.50; 
k. Payment made July 8, 1983 of $4532.50; 
1. Payment made August 16, 1983 of $4532.50; 
m. Payment made October 24, 1983 of $4532.50; 
n. Payment made December 15, 1983 of $4532.50; 
o. Payment made January 26, 1984 of $2266.25; 
p. Payment made April 16, 1984 of $6798.75; 
q. Payment made June 21, 1984 of $4532.50;. 
r. Payment made July 18, 1984 of $2266.25; 
s. Payment made August 15, 1984 of $2266.25; 
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t. Payment made October 1, 1984 of $2266.25; 
u. Payment made December 31, 1984 of $4532.50. 
(R. at 8614-17.) 
Defendant Doms also argued he was entitled to a refund of all taxes paid on the 
property with interest and presented an exhibit to the trial court that showed the amount 
of taxes to that date. (R. at 8612.) Defendant Doms agreed that the property should be 
rescinded by his issuing a Quit-Claim Deed back to Plaintiffs. 
However, the trial court chose only to award the $10,000.00 earnest money, the 
$72,500.00 down payment, and the taxes paid, but refused to award the interest payments 
made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note. (R. at 8950-51.) The court's refusal to award 
these interest payments on the contracts amounts to $72,520.00 in payments plus interest, 
which itself, at a rate often percent (10%) over a period of twenty years (the approximate 
time this money has been in Plaintiffs' possession), totals well over $400,000.00. The 
trial court's presumptuous and selective reading of this Court's mandate is clearly 
contrary to the law of the case and contrary to the law in general. See the Court's 
Modified Judgment (Add. 1). 
In remanding this case to the lower court for judgment, the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals specifically stated: 
"We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and 
award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus 
interest." Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ^21, 984 P.2d 392 (Add 
3.). 
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The Court went on in footnote 12 on page 398 to state "Doms is entitled to a refund of 
monies paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest 
to McCoy and Domcoy." Id. at ^[21, n.12. 
It seems very clear that the law of the case is that Defendant Doms should be 
entitled to all monies paid on this contract. The Utah Court of Appeals does not make an 
exception for interest paid, and therefore the Court's refusal to award the $72,520.00 in 
payments plus interest is contrary to the law of the case {see Point II infra). 
The purpose of rescission and restitution1 is to return the parties to the status quo 
and to recover the payments made on the contract. "Payments", in context of a land sale, 
are not limited to earnest money payments but, rather, refer to any benefit the purchaser 
conferred to the seller. 
The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties to the status quo to 
the extent possible, Horton v. Horton, 659 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984), or as 
demanded by the equities in the case, Forsythe v. Elkins, 216 Mont. 108, 
700 P.2d 596 (1985). In the case of a rescission, the plaintiffs are entitled 
to be returned to the status quo and to recover the payments made on the 
contract less the fair rental value of the premises for the time they had 
possession thereof. Farmer v. Groves, 276 Or. 563, 555 P.2d 1252 (1976); 
see also Matannska Valley Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1968); 
Benzer v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976). 
1
 The terms restitution and rescission are frequently used together, sometimes as if 
they were synonymous. Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, the Law of Property, § 
10.7 (1984). This memorandum will also use the terms synonymously. 
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Diigan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (affirming trial court's 
award to purchaser of amounts purchaser paid for real property, including monthly 
mortgage payments.) 
In the case of a seller's breach of a land purchase contract, it is well settled law 
that rescission requires the seller to return all monies paid by the purchaser (hence, all 
monies received by the seller), plus interest on those monies, minus a sum representing 
the fair rental value, if one exists. See, e.g. Brener-Harris on, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(affirming return of all money paid by the purchaser, including 
interest-only payments, in case of rescission); Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1984) (affirming award of all amounts paid by purchaser to seller, less rental value, as 
appropriate remedy for rescission); Lee v. Yang, 987 P.2d 519 (Or. App. 1999) (vendor 
must return all of purchaser's payments where rescission is awarded in a contract for the 
sale of property); Robison v. Katz, 610 P.2d 201 (N.M. App. 1980) (purchaser entitled to 
return of all consideration paid for land, with interest, in case of rescission of land sales 
contract); Farmer v. Groves, 555 P.2d 1252 (1976) (purchasers entitled to be returned to 
status quo and to recover payments made on contract in rescission of land sales contract); 
Lyerla v. Watts, 482 P.2d 318 (Nev. 1971) (in case of rescission, purchaser entitled to 
restitution of amount paid on purchase price under contract of sale); Matanuska Valley 
Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1968) (upon rescission of land sales agreement, 
purchaser entitled to return of money paid on purchase price, including interest and any 
amount expended in payment of taxes, plus interest, in addition to other remedies); Millor 
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v. Remior, 383 P.2d 596 (Idaho 1963) (purchaser entitled to all purchase money paid 
together with interest thereon from time of payment.) Thus, it is a required component of 
the law of rescission that rescission, in the context of a land purchase contract, demands 
return of all money paid to the seller, including interest-only payments. 
This required component of rescission comes from the very meaning and purpose 
of rescission. Rescission "suggests the returning, by a party to a contract, of the 
performance he or she has received from the other party." Cunningham, Stoebuck and 
Whitman, The Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984), citing 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1102 (1964). 
Rescission "refers to a judicial order compelling the defendant to return to the plaintiff 
the value of the performance he or she has rendered, thus returning the plaintiff to the 
position he had before the contract was formed." Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, 
the Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984), citing 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1112 (1964). "For 
example, if the purchaser under a land sale contract declares it rescinded because the 
vendor refuses to convey title as agreed, the purchaser may well seek not only his earnest 
money and other payments made but also a judgment for loss-of-bargain damages." 
Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, The Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984) (emphasis 
added.) Other treatises explaining the purpose of rescission concur. See e.g. Restatement 
of the Law, Second, Contracts § 370 Comment (a) and § 371, Comment (a) (1981) 
(emphasis added.): 
A party's restitution interest is his interest in having restored to him any 
benefit available that he has conferred on the other party. . . . The 
requirement of this section is generally satisfied if a benefit has been 
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conferred, and it is immaterial that it was later lost, destroyed, or 
squandered. A party who is liable m restitution for a sum. of money must 
pay an amount equal to the benefit that has been conferred upon him. If the 
benefit consists simply of a sum of money received by the party from whom 
restitution is sought, there is no difficulty in determining this amount." 
Furtheniioie, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that where there is 
rescission of an agreement involving real property, "the buyers are entitled to be returned 
to the status quo and to recover the payments made on the contract, ics^ U\*. I;U. .-CVA. 
\ all le of 1:l:i e prei n ises " Ditgi v ? i , ' 01 le s, 724 I } 2d 955 957 (I Jtah 1986)(emphasis 
added). These payments constitute "lost profit or other related consequential damages," 
and "include expenses resulting from fraud, loss of good vv ill, any expenditures in 
mitigatioi i of dan lages, lost ear rungs, prejudgment .interest; and i.j.o ,>i fairest on loans 
required to finance the business." ONG Int'l (USA) Ind, i. . / ' Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 457 (Utah 1993)(relying on Dan B Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 9.2, 
at 5v.v ; , i ' i emphasis ii i IL >^ 
Althouu- me Utah Cuuit ui \ppeals did not mention this part of the decision in 
ONG Int'l in its own ruling i n Anderson ^ >. Dorm (1999 I JT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 
3.)), it did cite to ON G Int'l and it did specifically hold tl: iat inter est si lould be a w ai ded on 
rema i id Sh tee O NG h it'I states that both ty pes of interest are available as a remedy, a rid 
since under the law of the case doctrine the appellate decision must be strictly followed, 
the trial coin t clearly erred in failing to award the mterest on the contract carried by the 
sellers, ai id th/i is paid of necessity ai id by agreement to finance the contract i intil the 
balloon payment was due. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IS BOUND BY THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
The trial court's opinion that "had the money been borrowed from any other party, 
Defendant Doms would have had to repay it... (t)he Court cannot see a legal basis for 
allowing this interest on the trust deed note to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the 
interest payments shall not be recovered by Doms" is a position directly contrary to the 
law of rescission and the law of the case as mandated by this Court and is clearly 
erroneous. (R. at 8950-51.) Neither Plaintiffs' counsel nor the court cited any authority 
for this proposition, and this conclusion made by the Judge in paragraph 4 of the 
Modified Judgment is clearly contrary to the law of the case and case law and authority 
generally on the subject. The Judge's reasoning is flawed because if the money had been 
borrowed from a third party and paid on this contract, sellers would have still been 
responsible to Doms for a return of those payments upon rescission. 
The law of the case doctrine is something that has been clearly established at Utah 
law and civil law in general for hundreds of years. Perhaps the best and most recent 
analysis of the law of the case doctrine appears in the Utah Supreme Court case of Gildea 
v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75, %9, 31 P.3d 543, as follows: 
"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal 
bind the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case 
return on appeal after remand. See, e.g. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995); Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 
1990); see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 849 (1993). The doctrine was 
developed to promote the obedience of inferior courts as well as 'to avoid 
the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and 
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reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case.' 
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037. The effect of abandoning the doctrine in the 
context of a post-remand appeal to the appellate court would not be 
inconsequential, because considerable inefficiencies would result if parties 
were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of this 
court. The doctrine, however, is not applied inflexibly. Id. at 1038; see 
also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 149(b) (1990). Indeed, this court need not apply the 
doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in 
preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. Thurston, 892 P.2d at I ^39. 
Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not be enforced under the 
following exceptional circumstances: 
(1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling 
authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) 
when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
Id.; see also 18 Charles Allen Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 4478, at 790 (1981). Therefore, although the doctrine is not an 
inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its former decisio 
waived only for the most cogent of reasons." 
Thus, the only inquiry to be considered by this Court in reviewing the trial ion- -"s 
refusal to award the mterest payments made on flu *eal estate contract as outline n 
Poii it 1. supf t i", is the 1:1 i i ee pi onged inqi ii- • - •..-.;,•',/ . ' - .-^  •••*.•!. 
been no intervening change of controlling authority; there is no claiin that new evidence 
has become available; and there is no reason the Court shotild be convi need that its prior 
decisioi I was cleai \y ei roneoi is a nd t;,v oi lid ' v orl : a ma n ifest in ji istice Indeed 1:1: i 2 on h « 
manifest injustice or clear error on display m this case belongs to the trial court, winch 
inexplicably refused to follow the mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals to "restore the 
par ties to the stati is qi 10 at the time the pa 1 ties entei ed i nto the contract" ( Ande * ; son \ 
Doms, 1.999 UT App 207,If 20, 984 P.2d 392) and inexcusably failed to.allow Doms "a 
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refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor 
in interest to McCoy and Domcoy" (Id. at ^[21, n. 12). 
Not only is there no reason for this Court to depart from the doctrine of the law of 
the case, but there is every reason in the world for this Court to find that the trial court's 
refusal to follow the mandate from the Utah Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous and 
worked a manifest injustice upon Defendant Doms. 
CONCLUSION 
The Complaint in this case was originally filed by Appellees in 1985. The case 
has been up to the Utah Court of Appeals on four occasions (on one prior occasion it was 
remanded as being premature and not ripe for appeal) and up to the Utah Supreme Court 
three times on one Petition for Interlocutory Relief and two separate Petitions for 
Certiorari. This appeal, as stated previously, constitutes the third substantive appeal in 
the case. It is time for this Court to end this seventeen year plus case and issue a mandate 
back to the district court ordering it to award Doms the $72,520.00 in interest payments 
plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the appropriate legal rates, and to order the 
trial court to continue to implement as part of that final judgment all other provisions of 
its Order, including the determination that the property in question had no fair rental 
value and that Appellees had failed to provide any evidence of such. 
Only by this direct mandate to the lower court requiring the specific components 
of the judgment necessaiy can this Court rest reasonably assured that no further appeals 
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will be taken in this case, and that the case will finally end. The interests of justice so 
dictate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED this *J_ day of rflA*fe , 2002. 
COHNF P \PPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
eta-?-"-
LARRY KA KELLER 
Attorney lor Defendant/Appellant 
CERUHl A IE UF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct cupv of the foregoing to be mailed, 
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this \0* day of ~pA*r<L , 2002, to: 
Irving H. Biele, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1235 East 2nd South, #301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Larry A. Kirkham 
Attorney at Law 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, r'.t. 
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo— 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, 
Representative of the Estate MODIFIED JUDGMENT 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, : 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
EUGENE E. DOMS, : 
Defendants. : 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, Civil N n 8 11' > 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, : 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, : 
Third Party Defendant. 
07/09/01 ION 10:25 FA. 1^3 003 
ELLEN AN DERSON, as Personal : • 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL1") W A W Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate Civil. IN \ »< Jfco 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC , a : 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS : 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, : 
Defendants. 
ooOoo-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on June 29, 2000 on Defendant Doms' 
Motion to Enter Judgment on the June 24, 1999 Decision of the ( It; ill C< :« u t of A { >pe ; ds with Ii < ring 
H, Biele, Esq. present and representing Plaintiffs and Larry R. Keller, Esq. present and representing 
Defendant Eugene E. Doras. 
This Court finds and determines that despite the efforts on the part of Plaintiffs to continue to 
argue matters conclusively decided Si \ the Ji me M, 199S* I )«< e,mn <il (he I I Lull * .ui.it ol A41pe.il ,, ,uid 
upheld by the J eih Supreme O m i t when it denied Certiorari in this matter, Judgment according to 
t h e i > ; .eeiOH n *. e . . • \ . j . - n • . i ( - > " ' - : : : • i « n - . . *. 
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1. Recission as ordered by the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy in this matter, 
2. Defendant Eugene R D o m s has been determined by lln" 1 H.di l Vnui n| Appeals h' bu 
fully entitled to all amounts paid under the contract upon its recission, and this Court 
declines to rule differently than the Utah Cou. - . ,» .v* • 
Court found Doms to be entitled to a refund of monies paid <u; one ot the nj.- nal 
buyers of the property, and as tlie siiccessor in interest r \ ;. • • , • = . 
3. Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all i ight, title and interest to the property subject 
to his receiving the following sums: 
a. $10,000,00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which 
shall be the sum. of $28,731.5] through August 1, 2000 and $2. i 4 pei i I; ij 
thereafter; 
b. The sum of $72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest 
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86 
per day thereafter; 
c. All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interest from the date the 
payment was made which shall be the ^um ot $2J,< * ,J • ' J» through Amy. n I, 
2000 and $4.26 per day thereafter. 
4. Payments made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note which were interest payments shall 
not be recoverable by Defendant Doms It is the Court's opinion that had the money 
been borrowed from any other party, Defendant Doms would have h : ' . ? - ; • ;•.. 
The Court cannot see a legal basis for allowing this interest on the Trust Deed Note 
3 
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to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the interest payments shall not be recovered 
> . 
5. he i'\)urt of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair rental 
' < * we v ei the Coi u 1: fi i: ids 1 1 i at tl vei ecoi (lis completely devoid of ai 13 ba sis for 
rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in any way by Defendant 
Doms. Therefore the Cpur t: declines to reduce the Judgment in this case by any rental 
value, finding there is no fair rental value to be placed upon, the p.r operty. 
6. I he Court chooses not to revisit the attorney's fees issue as such fees were necessary 
to set aside the Default Judgment in 'this case; therefore no award is made for 
recovery of said attorney's fees by Defendant Doms. 
7. This Court finds that there has been an unwillingness on thejgaxLofPkkttifl^ 
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and^kfaSugh the Court does not believe that 
ftlaintiffs7 counsel has intenjieiially attempted to mislead it th ere el earlj ha s bt t i i a 
breach of Ruk^wi th regard to arguments made by counsel and the sum of $500.00 
jg*s^arded as attorney's fees to Defendant Doi ns. 
8. All amounts awarded here shall bear judgment at the legal post judgment interest rate 
from the date this Judgment is entered. 
| * # 
4 
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A 
DATED this / ^ d a y of 
BYTHECOURT: 
KQBEjnr H1LDER 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM 2 
D7/09/01 M0N 09:09 FAX t£]002 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, et al, 
Plaintiffs, MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, et al, Civil No. 850698339 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter is before the court for decision of numerous pending motions, all connected 
with this court's bench Ruling of June 29, 2000. To the court's surprise and constemation,ybwr 
Notices to Submit have been filed. The court cannot fully explain the course of events that has 
created this unprecedented (for this court) circumstance, but until receipt of Mr. Keller's June 26, 
2001, letter, on July 5, 2001, the court was completely unaware of the last three Notices. 
As noted, the matter was argued and decided on June 29, 2000. Thereafter, a proposed 
judgment was submitted and the file placed on the judge's desk, Mr. Biele then contacted the 
court and indicated that he would be traveling, and he requested a modest extension to file 
additional pleadings. Because the judge was about to leave the country for almost two weeks, 
Mr. Biele was advised that the matter would not be decided immediately in any event The file 
was set aside in the judge's Coalville office. Over the next couple of months, numerous 
additional pleadings were filed, but the judge never saw another Notice to Submit, and in time 
the case was overlooked in the press of other matters. The judge should have realized the case 
was languishing, but he did not, and the court now offers its sincere apologies to all parties and 
both counsel for the unconscionable delay. 
For ease of reference only, the court"will refer to the parties as Anderson and Doms. The 
matters before the court are numerous, but related. Doms' proposed Judgment was resubmitted 
in a modified form to address Anderson's Objection to certain interest calculations. The court 
finds the Objection was correct in principle, and the modification resolved the problem. 
Accordingly, the court has this date signed the Modified Judgment as proposed, except that the 
court has deleted paragraph 7 for the reasons stated below. 
Doms has also moved, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend that 
portion of the judgment that denies repayment of Doms1 interest payment on the loan from 
plaintiffs. For the reasons stated at the hearing, and generally in accord with the "dual capacity" 
37/09/01 MON 09:09 FAX 1^003 
reasoning articulated in Anderson's opposition to the Motion, the court denies the Motion and 
affirms its prior decision, which is now set forth in the signed Modified Judgment 
Anderson has filed several motions which all, in essence, ask the court to change its 
ruling. They include a Motion to Correct, Modify, or Reconsider, a Motion to Expand or 
Broaden the Proposed Judgment, and a "Corrected" Motion to Expand, etc. They are ail either 
motions to amend or reconsider. A centerpiece of all is the continued assertion that there is no 
basis to find that Doms is successor-in-interest to McCoy and DomCoy A second part of each 
Motion is a request that the court reconsider its imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, in the form of an 
award of $500 attorney's fees. 
The court shares Doms' counsel's inability to understand why Mr. Bieie continues to 
urge a position that seems so completely at odds with the law of the case so bluntly stated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, but ironically, his continued assertions cause this court to question its 
basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Biele seems to sincerely believe that (1) there is no 
factual basis for the successor-in-interest conclusion and, (2) even if that is the law of the case, 
the charge to this court is to restore Doms to his position before the events underlying this case 
occurred, and that position does not include any consideration of the position of the parties to 
whose interests he succeeded. While this court does not believe it has any such latitude, and that 
Doms is now, for all intents and purposes, McCoy and DomCoy, the court cannot find the 
repeated and unavailing argument was urged maliciously or in bad faith. Accordingly, the Rule 
11 finding is vacated. 
The court specifically instructs Mr. Biele, however, that he is not to raise the successor-
in-interest argument at the trial court level again, unless he has successfully argued the matter on 
some subsequent appeal and the terms of remand specifically permit such argument. Any 
violation of this instruction shall result in the imposition of sanctions in an amount to be 
determined. 
Except for the Rule 11 issue, Anderson's several Motions are without merit, and are 
DENTED. The Modified Judgment is the entered this date. This signed Minute Entry shall be 
the Order of the court, and no further Order is required unless counsel for Doms feels he needs 
some additional formal order to ensure finality of at least this stage of the proceedings, in which 
case he may submit an Order consistent with this Minute Entry. 
DATED this 7th day of July, 200 L 
By the Court: 
^wlWMWIIf*, 
— « < / r — / ^--aggi $—*si 
RoberrK. Hilder, District C|*ttfl[ •&&&NTy / ^ f 
ADDENDUM 3 
392 Utah 984 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
gious to-permit the imposition of the death 
penalty. See State v. ^Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1248 (Utah 1993) ("we can confidently 
say beyond a reasonable doubt that even if 
the jury had not considered the invalid ag-
gravator, it would have returned a.verdict of 
death"), cert denied, 510 U.S.'979r 114 S.Ct. 
476, 126 L.Ed^d 427 (1993).. .The trial court 
found overwhelming aggravating .evidence 
and rejected all of Lovell's mitigation theo-
ries. As,in Archuleta, leaving out, the "per-
sonal gain" aggravator would not have re-
duced Lovell's. sentence, so any error is 
harmless.beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
[14] fl 46 Lovell claims that his trial coun-
sel performed ineffectively' because he did 
not raise the constitutional challenges to the 
specific aggravating circumstances that Lo-
vell raises' oh 'appeal. •' In order to prove his 
claim,' Lovelf-must' identify ^ specific-acts or 
.^missions by, counsel,which fell,below an 
objective. standard of.{reasonableness, over-
coming, the. presumption
 T>that counsel ren-
dered
 T constitutionally. ..adequate.,, assistance. 
^ ^ m ^ ^ ^ C t . m Z r 80l.Ed.2d 674 
.(1984).;., Furthermore, .under Strwjtfarid, Lo-
vell rn;ust* ;also ^ fGrmafi^y. prove.. that. the 
challenged acts_ or omissions, undermine .con-
fidence in the outcome of his trial . See Id at 
694, 104'SiCt.'2052'." As" we have discussed, 
Lovell's counsel had no basis on which to 
challenge the constitutionality of the' death 
penalty statute/including' the specific a'ggra-
vators.'^ The'Constitutionality .of thee- statute 
has 'been' upheld'bythis':Court,"'sb'rcdunsel 
had no .reasonxto >believe£h£ couldiinake . a 
legitimate - constitutional ^ challenge. '.*' »(AsN we 
have noted,f'.the;'trialr-i2ourt-• could.and*did 
consider < all -the evidence: in the. caseJ under 
the general sentencing1 provision;.without re-
lying1 explicitly<on the specific aggravators as 
aggravators. • challenged why > Lovell^ •< Lovell 
fails' torestabHshTthat hisicounsel's "failure to 
challenge^ the vstatutory |jrbvisions" fellUbelow 
aiff//bbjective"^sHaiKlard^>Df ^reasonableness. 
iTfaerefore,«LoveD?sielate does hot'dvercome 
iimned -kadficjuatSlyj^ lovell's ; constitutional 
claims must fail; ^ '••-o'" '.^ •: •..• -•;-!; •:•/!,^-^ 
CONCLUSION 
1147 Because we find that all of Lovell's 
claims fail, we affirm his conviction and sen-
tence of death. 
, X h i ^ Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART, 
'justice'-|lMMERMAN,,and Justice 
RUSSON concur in Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM'S opinion.-. 
( O f Kit NUMBER SYSTCM > 
1999 UTApp 207 
Ellen ANDERSON, as personal represen-
tative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Dan Scott; Ellen Anderson, personally; 
and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
, and Cross appellants, 
v. 
Eugene £.-DOMS and Michael R. McCoy, 
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross 
appellee. 
No. 971762-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 24, 1999. 
Vendors^ brought' suit for foreclosure 
based on default on trust deed note given'to 
secure balance'owed otf purchase price. Pur-
chaser cpunterciaimed for rescission or .dam-
ages (for'breachof implied covenants^ breach 
ofpjCoptxacij £ fraud,,' and
 r misrepresentation. 
ToUowing
 4l^nch.1 trial, Ihe District. Qourt de-
nied request/or rescission, based upon Inches 
and J awarded i^urehaseri monetary • damages. 
as iresult^'^eijciirabrances on propertjyi,!X,he. 
CoinliTof^^ipeals-remiided; for additional 
-fmdingsf,on'flacnes.j On/rematid, the District 
<^^iBg^^^&^th&t Caches: bari^nrescis-'' 
*ion;«id'rawardedi attorney 'fees' and J.cbsts. 
Both (sidesV'afjpealed,; TTje. Court of Appeals, 
^reetiwp^j}; ' $ Md^tha^ (1) 'vendors 'did • hot 
suiTar requisite-prejudice to support laches 
bar to rescission claim} f (2) rescission was 
ANDERSON v. DOMS 
Cite as 984 P.2d 392 (UtahApp. 1999) 
uian o^O 
appropriate remedy for vendors' breach of 
covenant; (3) there was no statutory or con-
tractual basis to support award of fees and 
jcosts to purchaser; and (4) vendors were 
.entitled, to fees incurred in securing default 
judgment on foreclosure claim that was sub-
sequently vacated. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., dissented. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(8.1) 
Although the determination of whether a 
party was prejudiced for purposes of the 
doctrine of laches is a legal conclusion that is 
reviewed for correctness, trial court's find-
ings of fact underlying that conclusion will 
•not be set aside unless they are clearly erro-
•neous. 
2. Appeal and Error <2>842(1) 
,.. •. Whether attorney fees are recoverable is 
a question of law which is reviewed for cor-
rectness, 
3. Appeal and Error «=>1024.1 
'"••-''
;
 The sufficiency of a trial court's findings 
•'supporting ah"award of attorney fees is're-
'viewed under a correctioh-of-error standard. 
4. Appeal and Error <8=*757(3) 
Appellant was'relieved of his burden to 
marshal'evidence by reason of inadequacy of 
..trial, court's findings, which were unsupport-
e d in J record. or did : not support ultimate 
conclusion on issue of laches. 
5.. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>119 
t. :. Purchaser's failure to. pay. taxes on prop-
etfr^jpii^ resultog'^to^lBale^di^ noy prejudice 
venoom so,as to support jaihes,bar. based on 
. p u ^ a j a ^ s ^ d e ^ • rescission of 
real ^ estate contrac^f^ere^tax, .sale, was; ulti-
raately/ileclare'd" void and purchaser paid tax-
es and regafoed title to>roperty. ... 
,6. , \Ven(frr^d*I^ \ 
*
;
 ,\>©elay ir* seeking rescission of real estate 
^contaraWdid^noC^^ through 
loss;,of ^toesse^ P5Vevidence, ,soyas ,to raise 
...laches, b a r / f o ^ e g ^ f e ^ claim, • .despite, death 
of one Vendor; ini^teriia, absent/proof that 
vendors were deprived, to their prejudice, of 
any specific evidence or testimony.' 
7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=119 
Loss in value of property did not by 
itself show that vendors were prejudiced by 
purchaser's delay in bringing rescission ac-
tion, so as to raise laches bar to rescission 
claim. 
8. Equity <3=>72(4) 
. Increase or decrease in the value of 
property alone does not satisfy the prejudice 
prong of the laches defense. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser 3=>ll9 
Trial court's finding that it would be 
inequitable to allow purchaser to rescind con-
tract ^ because he would benefit from his poor 
decisions, was moral judgment, not fact find-
ing, and did not support conclusion that ven-
dors, were prejudiced by purchaser's delay in 
seeking rescission of contract and that rescis-
sion was accordingly barred by laches. 
10. Vendor and Purchaser <s>119 
Purchaser's failure to make payments 
under trustee deed note did not show that 
vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's fail-
ure to perform, so as to impose laches bar 
based on purchaser's delay in bringing re-
scission action, where any prejudice was pre-
cipitated by vendors' breach of covenant 
against encumbrances. 
11. Vendor and Purchaser <^> 119 
Absent proof that vendors were preju-
diced by purchaser's several year delay in 
bringing, action to rescind real estate pur-
chase contract, laches did not;bar relief;' 
endor and Pu rchase r^ l lQ ' 12.;'vVena r a u ruauuov. - , 
, ^Rescission of contract was proper rerae-
dyffor, -vendor's breach of covenant against 
encumbrances. ., .-.. ;;:-.;. ,
 ;.:.. 
,13,'vVendor and Purchaser <$=>126, , .
 v.... 
fc'Upon' rescission of contract for vendor's 
breach of.warranty in case in which purchas-
er.'/' made . no significant improvements or 
changes to real property, purchaser was enti-
tled to return of net payments made on trust 
deed note less rental value of property plus 
interest. • 
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14. Costs <S»i94.i6 
th*tt0niey f 6 e S ^ recoverable only • if 
£ « * a statutory or contractual b a S J 
awarding such fees. "*sis ior 
15, Covenants 3=132(2) ; ^ ? 
Purchaser who was successful in o b £ -
S T n ° f " ^ " ^ - ^ t ' b a s e a ^ n 
w ^ t t L T ; : n t a g a h s t ™ b r a n c e s ' 
was not entitled to award of fees, as'there 
S Z award for rescission
 r e m e d y and pu?-
attempt to remove encumbrances. 
nq<j .BACKGROUND' , f;,-
-•••""•U2''In'',;Marchoi982;/ plaintiffs 'Dan'' 
Jeanne •. Scott,'• 'EUen^Anderson,;'''and D:(3§ 
Anderson, ^ £llen<; Anderson's1-now decease! 
husband, "sold a parceToT'property "known' af 
Rossi Hilis[(the property)*in Park^ City; UtsM 
to Doms and Michael R'. McCoy>forJ'reside^ 
tiai ^ develo^me^^Hrlnf-con^eption^^ t h | | 
sale,' plaintiffs' executedJ a.
 r Warranty ,- Deed! 
i that included a covenant' against encunv ZZ , £* ^ MaC°y r o u t e d a TVustl 
Deed MdJTiustiOeed^ofe to secure 3 
price, of SioiQ&n , n •__ , - , - .Huruidse, 
16. 
_ .-.,...v>. vu-wic purcnase.; 
price,;, of.^$1^,260,,,i Doraflj;#na\ McCoy- sjdapi 
V acquired an interest.in,a,parcel, adjoining,the| 
Mortgages e=>580, 581(3) - - ^ \ % property.;, kngwn i-A-fte-.^'slipper,pai:eeJ^ 
Vendors were entitled to attorney fee's i M c C o y ^ n q ^ g ^ 
; "
: ; 113In Iate^9*84 aorJ'early ;,1985,: DomsV 
and costs incurred in securing default judg-
ment in foreclosure action .against purchase/ 
under trust deed'note, but'not to btner fees 
incurred in litigation after default 'judgment ' 
was vacated, as'purchaser'ultimately pre-
vailed. 
Larry R.' Keller,'. Keller & Lundgren' Lc, 
Salt Lake City,; for Appellant- '
 r"'" '''"''"" ' 
- I rv ing ; H., Biele. and Curtis C. ^Nessett, 
Nygaard,- Coke- & -Vincent,.Salt'Lake City, 
for Appellees.:;:. j " : V^f.:^, ..:.' • >> .•.;;?*;"» 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., and 
BENCH and DAVIS/JJ?^ bur, voi.-<W/ .U 
OPINION; 
GREENWOOD, M m - ^ ^ a i w M 
..•HI Defendant Eugene
 t E. Doms appeals 
for.the s e c o n d • M ^ ' W i i d W ^ H m P o t ' 
*~,^  coocxnwits existed on the proper-, 
^ * $ ; ^ the* 
"scliedule^pai®nS ori^',iie'viiropei^Tand", at-: 
tempted to deeS the .property back "tc?$iain-
tiffs mTe tu rn^^ j (^c^^ t3pn n c^ ; . t h^5^ t 
years later, plaintiffs "obtained a default judg-
ment against Dom¥a3c?.M<i6o7^cauBg<the>y 
datied.-tditile ^ anrixiswe5;3n .response to '.plain-
W p ^ o m f c l a i n ^ ^ 
default Jjudgmen§i)b«n^j51ed ran ^ answer.Vand 
tfounterdiu^t^ Ap-
proximately fouCTiontha; later; the. trial !court 
.$ntered L WnPr§^Bet t^,^e.^er default 
J u d g m e n U g a i n ^ 
rSummit"'County-] 
nonpaymenfiJofl 
iZ£frzZi 'Z^Tc^up *;uiuiK on 
««nnns-„Biien .'Anderson y'and:isDan-Vand 
other^thlngg that the.doctrine oflwhes baw 




he>learned:of t l lc-
ANDERSON 
Cite at 984 P.2d 392 
gvhich they had transferred ;their interest in 
t^he property. After Doms : paid all delin-
•quent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, 
rSummit County conveyed the property to 
>Domcoy by quitclaim deed.-y/Dorncoy then 
fconveyed.-the ^property to i Doms.3 J-In the 
-meantime; plaintiffs had filed::another'action 
'ichallenging the tax'sale and subsequent pur-
chase of the property by Summit County, 
seeking to quiet title to the property in their 
favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County, 
plaintiffs, and Doms, the trial, court set, aside 
cthe tax sale. ..'.,. ;.','•• < '...' 
.. -115 In early 1988, Doms amended his coun-
terclaim, seeking rescission pf the contract 
I or, in the. alternative, damages for breach of 
implied, covenants, breach, ^ contract,. fraud, 
and-, misrepresentation. ^Jjijj}99pf .the rtrial 
was bifurcated and.a three day: trial was held 
onithe issue. :p .^" rescission.pf the .contract. 
,Plainti28-argue4,r0nithe basiscof laches, ;that 
Doms was .prohibited
 ; from .^rescinding. the 
contract, because there was an unreasonable 
delay between the time Doms learned of the 
basis for.rescission,;and,.his.^attempt to re-
scind the• contract. , The trial.court subse-
quehtly ^issued f' a "Memoran'dum'. Decision, 
finding -that because X)omsRuiireas6nably "de-
layed ^ seeking rescission^ lacHesr barredT re-
'scissioWof^the'cbntracV^^fiHl^ :V. ! ^ i i : 
'116 The^  remainder,of(i^e:mal fo<iise^.on 
the. issue of ^whether -Doms Vas ' entitled -to 
damages.as
 }a rresiolt, of ^ e ^encumbrances, pn 
. tie,^prppertyi
 3,;;'lfie, .fi^ ftjv cpurt :fi$o jield , a 
,'hearing on. tHe^su'e. of .attorney'fees."
 r .In its 
Second Amended;Findings of3Fact,and Con-
elusions of Lawland'Second ^Amended Judg-
^ - B e d u p p n f e ^ 6 8 ? ^ 
for ^rescission •* and 
suit of the". encumbrances' ojr r&e^property 
!
^osts ' .^TKe^ial court', also 
^ atom* • .a. 
m^n tUe^a l c iou r^ jt«Be 
med Doms*s ^request •' c 
arid:$101,50 
^se^eBtiy'jissued -Mi jmpubJWied ^ MeinpraD-
3~.-Oa ren^d,;_thc trial ( ^ u r t r ; ^ ^ that the'con-
••' vcyance'tof the'propcrty ifroni^ ^ t^uininit County to 
Doms after.the tax sale resulted,in Dom5 holding 
"clear title to the property.'j(^Therefore.;plain-
v. DOMS Utah 395 
(UtabApp. 1999) 
improperly applied the doctrine of laches to 
bar rescission of the contract without first 
entering findings of fact regarding whether 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in 
seeking rescission. See Anderson v, Doms, 
No. 920653-CA, slip op. at 2-3 (Utah CtApp. 
Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished mem. decision). 
Consequently, this' court remanded the case 
to the trial court for further findings on the 
issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court 
cannot find from the evidence presented that 
the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay, 
tjie equitable doctrine of laches should not 
bar the remedy of rescission." Id. On re-
mand, the trial court again refused to rescind 
the contract, concluding plaintiffs were preju-
diced by Doms's delay in seeking rescission. 
This appeal followed! " ' ;J' '•': 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF; REVIEW 
[11 118 Donis argues he. is, entitled to 
rescission because the'jtrial" court's' findings 
on remand do'riot
 (support its conclusion that 
plaintiffs
 twere.' prejudiced by his delay in 
seeking rescission of the' contract/ See Bor^ 
1987). 'Wo J_suc^^rul]y .assert'{a 'laches• "'Hie-
fejise;va' [party], paust*.esSblisn..both tfiaj "the 
[other.party).ui^easpnably.'delayed'in bring-
ingj'toVactionrftio*.r^c^H the 'contractj^and 
. that ;tt|e ^defendant^  'was^prejudiced by, that 
dela^.r' (atin^ JP(^ri^to'irp3.?_"^nter. 1$. 
Siydrhouse Sh^fypijlg Cir." Assoc?.', 63^ .P^d 
' 1^66^1260 '(U£an 1975))). '"Although % e ^ e -
termination of whether a party was" preju-
diced for purposes of the-doctrine of laches is 
a legal conclusion that we review for correct-
'riess^'we 7will ''ti6tva,et'vaside?•S,Jff^al• court's 
ffidingg ^m^m^^^^mmm 
unless they are clearly errpneausr ^Se&SMKt* 
.courtffi^  awardJCL .attorney-»fees / anxL costs. 
WKisthe>T,att^rney*'fees;are°'r^^ a 
306,^ -314 -(Utah 1998) :(citing Robertson v.. 
tiffs. argumenu premised on the contention that 
•'. Doras 'did nor hold title to the entire parcel are 
-•without merit. '• 
396 Utah 984 PACIFIC REPORTER,V2d SERIES 
Gem Ins., 828-;PJ2d 496, 499 (Utah GtjVpp. 
1992)). The sufficiency of a trial court's find-
ings supporting an award of attorney fees is 
also reviewed under a correction-of-error 
standard. See id. Finally, although!, trial 
courts 'are normally.;afforded .broad-discretion 
in determining what constitutes treasonable 
fee, see id., such, an-.award !:.V'must: berbased. 
on the evidence and supported by findings.of 
fact.'" Salmon v.+ Davis County, 916; P.2d 
890, 893 (Utah..1996) (quoting Cottonwood 
Mall Co. v. Sm;830,P.2d 266, 268.(Utah 
1992)). 
. ANALYSIS, "• 
' £".; Findings "of Fact . 
[4] U 10 In challenging
 r$ie. trial gourds 
findings of fact, Doms argues-he should be 
relieved-of/(.his .burden- to; jnarshal-,thg'-.eyj-r 
dence because of the inadequacy of the trial 
courts, findings. .See Woodward v. .Fazzio, 
823 P^d,^/47T :(Utali Ct^ |^i991^jThere 
is,' in' "effect,"n n'oJ
 t need ' for an; appellant !; to 
marshal the evidence'when tAe^fmdings^are 
so inadequate'that.they.cannot''Be^meaning-
fully' cjialleriged as 7factM^deten^ 
We 'agree, -'Because ffi^fihSui^ thorns chal-
lenges 'are eith^^t^uppofleol Jin'' the re'cora1 
.or dp h o t ' s u p p j ^ 
tiffs we^prejuo^^ 
for the,mbstLpar^'irre^eve]J *of' the fmatsTiaIin^ 
requirement.'.' •Ve^'er^orV address Dome's 
specific'challenges1 ;to vih'^  ;1tfial' couVt's^find-
ings of fact'.' " " " """ '*' ' !'; 
"&'" FindinglOa"*1 
. 'Witt svriknnioMiL.,,,.. 
.,1.11 .Finding, 10a ''-provides that j 
were pr^udicedtwcauserI)omfl,has an. 
4,-.'Finding IQaf*t i* i$&&^ 
'Doms had the use,and,:bencfitqf tlie'pfb^ri. 
ty 'to the exclusion, of the pla&fiff&i Hf £ ur^j 
chased the slipper,parcel aniat tempted^?, 
W i f o t e ^ i a n * ^ 
ed developme,nt1?,buC:-lwai ft i ii ft^fssfuIhlTher> 
P ^ ^ / j ^ c ^ ^ l g r e ^ o f t ^ jfem^ggejofc. 
Doms has an „ 
with'the plairit£&;(in*an intpgr^tedj'de^ek^-; 
ment is r e m p ^ p ,,t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
5. '"Finding 1 Ob states: 5T.'D6ms f failed ";to pay?the 
property taxes for the years 1982^.1983^1984,. 
1985 and 1986, which resulted in.a.tax sale and. 
estiin-.the :slipper parcel and would likely 
refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs in develop-
ing; the. adjoining property. However, plain-
tiffsjdo.jiot dispute that Doms's interest in 
•thel supper, parcel, was; extinguished at a tax 
sale^IBecause; this finding is inaccurate and. 
iwitho'ut; record support, -it is clearly i errone-
ous Smd;has. no.,relevance to the issue.of 
prejudice..:: 
B. 'Finding 10b5 
!
"'[5]' '1112 Finding 10b states that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced as a result of Doms's failure 
"to! pay- iaxes; on the property. ^However,'we 
'cannot see' how failure to pay property taxes 
prejudiced 'plaintiffs.•• Doms ultimately paid 
<tJie^axes''andrTegaihed title to the property. 
'Fur^erV'aiiparties stipulated that 'the -tax 
feale'^was • void"'andrthat plaintiffs'; trust' deed 
was^a"' Valid lien "on'the' property. 'Thus, 
yfihding'iOb does "not support the ;triat court's 
conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
DomsVdelay/1'' 
U
'C; •'* Findings 10c 6; and; l O d T 
r j ^ f l . 1 3 . ^ d i i i ^ l O c and^lOd^both.state 
t&^jDoin '^s^^elay^.JL^ .seeking, rescission re-
sult^^,the'^u^ya^bOjty.pf witngss.es., ,/U-
&ough it^is true that ^ne^arty^to^the^ngi-
r forgotten 
sate^f the property, these?findings do'not 
denwnstrate that' plaintiffs1 were' 'deprived of 
any*8pecinc *eviden6e or. testimony or how 
Tackibf-that evidence would adversely affect; 
plaintiffs, because Findings. 10c and lOd are 
rconcluaory and do.tnot include any informa-
-«y refltutee4 ^ /pWntJfff . to ,Ini^iaje :legaU;action;to . 
fa
'
!&ff"-. •.. .. 
tirmp^g^i^,js:k'i6Xjy<Mtrs[ .befor^^j-sought;;to 
; yresSJifed *hV transacSoir aidvers^lytajEfected.' the : 
•n tp l a fe f i ^^ppor t i ^^ 
ci raerftan^ease^ 
,j-:.would-beMonavailable and memories are dimmed 
-/;*by3if&rlapse of time.-' * '' ' 
ANDERSON v. DOMS 
Cite as 984 P.2d 392 (UtahApp. 1999) 
Utah 397 
tion about testimony that plaintiffs'could not 
elicit as a result of the delay, these findings 
do not support the trial court's conclusion of 
prejudice. 
H 14 Finding lOd also states that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced because Doms's delay pre-
vented them from resolving the'Vencroach-
ments on the property.;; '-However, plaintiffs 
have not shown how Doms's delay ;made re-
moving the encroachment^ :any more difficult 
than it would have been'before the sale of 
the property or in the. event plaintiffs reac-
quire the property. ' Thus; finding 18d does 
not show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms's delay. 
,D. Rndipgs,10e;8 and10f,9,, 
•in [7,8] % 15 FindingslOe and Nutate-that 
•plaintiffs were prejudiced because ;the prop-
erty suffered a fifty percent decrease in val-
[ue ;during .the time..that -Doras possessed it. 
The first time this.case was appealed, we 
specifically rejected the ^argument that an 
increase or decrease in the value of property 
alone satisfies.'the;prejudice prong of the 
.laches.defense.,:;]^ Qfyild v. Child, 8t\Jiah 
:2d; 261, 271,,ml^2d.;98i, 988 .ftJtah 1958) 
-:(stating ^ naUIral^cremen^^,iJ^ value of prop-
erty ,dpes notj standing, alone,, constitute prej-
udice for, purposes, of laches dcKjtrine);., see 
alsq^est Los> Angeles Instjfor' fiancer i?e-
-aearchyy. Mayer, Mb .F^dl, 220, 228 (9th 
Cir4966) (same)^ Ratherrja ^change in.prop-
ertyvjvalue is,.only one iactor a^pourt may 
^cgnsic\er.,in
 <:determim^g>;^rejudice for the 
.purpose ;p.f: laches.;,•.. See Jbamon \y. Haynes, 
111^^26rf741^'7^4^aPth .Gif.1948);,.Filler v. 
. ^ M ^ ^ 7 ^ p n U ^ n 8 0 6 P.^d 537, .540 
(1991);' 'J4Wh8Q7)M Ja<^p80^,i67r?2d 156, 
>153 ( U ^ a ^ % ^ . T h e r e J f p r e ^ 
l ad ing t^afcl^g prpjp^gty^siifferedja decrease 
(jn^aiueydoes:>nc& in afl4,pf itsel|f show.that 
^ t o t i | ^ ^ r e ^ i ^ o ^ ^ y s D ^ n a . ' s delay. 
^ ^ i n o ^ ' o P f a ^ l O e ' s ^ f ^ ^ ^ 'time 
.^Doins^f'l^Jmcoy^^teiprlswl^Inc. l<and Summit 
^^C^unty y ^ ^ ^ S j e s ^ ^ f of;.the property, the 
-9,/oFinding.of fact JlQf,states; ilDouyb's] inexperi-
jj^jpnce mJde,ye^pDJn|;(pr^perty> pr>(inaj)iiity .^o,seU 
the 'property impacted the "plamtifisVJgreatIy' be-
cause of down turn in the real estat^ e. market and 
the increased costs to develop the property if 
they chose to do so." ^ 
E. Finding lOg ] 
[9] 1116 Finding lOg states that it would 
be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind the 
contract because he "should not benefit from 
his poor decisions." Because this statement 
appears to be nothing more than a moral 
judgment, unsupported by any evidence or 
law, we cannot say that it supports the trial 
court's conclusion that plaintiffs were preju-
diced. 
F. Finding lOh n 
[10] 1117 Finding lOh, actually a legal 
conclusion, states that Doms may not rescind 
the contract because he was in default. We 
disagree. Although Doms failed to make 
payments required by the Trust Deed Note, 
he was excused from doing so as a result of 
plaintiffs' breach of the.,covenant against en-
cumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master Protec-
tion Corp., 883 ?2d 295, 301 (Utah CtApp. 
1994) ("The law is well settled that a material 
breach by one party to a contract excuses 
further performance by the ..nonbreaching 
party.") (citing Saunders v. Sharp,.840 P.2d 
.796,-:806 (Utah CtApp.1992)); -Wright v. 
Westside Nursery, :787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
CtApp.1990);. Bergstrom u Moore, 677 P.2d 
1123,1125 (Utah: 1984) ("If it plainly appears 
that a seller has lost or encumbered his 
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill 
his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer 
continue to make payments."). Any preju-
dice that resulted'from Doms's failure'to 
make* payments pursuant to the Trust Deed 
-Note was precipitated by plaintiffs' breach" of 
warranty. Because plaintiffs may not breach 
the .contract, and then claim they,, were preju-
dice^ by. Doms's failure to perform, this.find-
,jngr does not support the trial
 ;court's; conclu-
sion that plaintiffs were prejudiced.
 r <S[:) .-j,•; i 
10. 'Finding of feet lOg states: ''Doras snould not 
-'• benefit from his'poor'decision1'at the expense"of 
I •) the plaintiffs; To allow that .to ^ happen would.be 
11. Finding'of fact 1 Oh states:4 "Boms was In 
default; therefore, he could not invoke-the doc-
trine of rescission." 
i | 
3-§. 
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